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GENDER INEQUALITY AND WAGE
DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN THE SEXES: IS IT
INEVITABLE OR IS THERE AN ANSWER?
I. INTRODUCTION
Labor compensation for many individuals in the United States is still
determined by gender, despite over thirty years of civil rights
legislation.' Specifically, women in the United States labor under an
emploment system in which they earn comparatively less than men.2 In
the early 1960s, women earned about 590 for every dollar earned by
men.3 In 1992, women earned about 710 for every dollar earned by
men.4 College-educated women in 1993 earned only roughly $2000
more than high-school-educated white men.5 More puzzling, however,
is that as women mature, and presumably gain work experience, the
1. The Fair Pay Act of 1994: Joint Hearing on H.R. 4803 Before the Subcomm. on
Select Education and Civil Rights on Educ. and Labor and Subcomm. on Compensation
and Employee Benefits on Post Office and Civil Service, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 52, 53
(1994) [hereinafter Fair Pay Hearings] (statement of Michele Leber, Treasurer, Nat'l
Comm. on Pay Equity).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. During their lifetimes, women lost approximately $420,000 because of unequal
pay. Id.
5. Id. In addition, college-educated women receive 29% less than their male
counterparts. Id.
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wage differential between men and women grows larger.6 Young
women between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four earn 93% of the
wages earned by men similarly aged, while older women between the
ages of fifty-five and fifty-nine earn only 62% of the wages earned by
men their age.7
Congress' first attempt to address the pay disparity between men
and women was the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA).8 The EPA's purpose
is to prohibit pay disparity between men and women who perform "equal
work."9 The EPA prevents an employer from paying a woman, solely
because she is a woman, less than a man when they perform essentially
similar jobs." Simultaneously, however, the EPA's equal work
requirement limits the ability to challenge discriminatory wage disparity
6. See id. When a woman is compensated for her work experience, she receives an
increase of 30 cents per hour; a man with experience receives an increase of $1.20 per
hour. Id.
7. Id.
8. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 206 (1994) (amending the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-
19 (1994))). The Equal Pay Act provides:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate ... between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to
employees ... at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of
the opposite sex.., for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal
skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994). An employer can pay employees of the opposite sex
different wages if the differential is based on a factor other than sex, such as a seniority
or merit system, or differences in the quantity or quality of production. Id. If an employer
violates § 206, it may not reduce an employee's wage rate in order to remedy the wage
disparity. Id.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). Equal work requires "equal skill, effort and responsibility
... performed under similar working conditions." 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13(a). If two
employees are performing equal work, the employer must pay them the same rate.
§ 1620.13(c). When determining whether two employees are performing equal work, an
employer should consider the time each employee spends performing various duties, and
how the skills, efforts, and responsibilities of the positions differ. § 1620.14.
10. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13(b)(1) (distinguishing between "male jobs" and
"female jobs" is discriminatory); § 1620.13(b)(2) (noting a prima facie violation if an
employee replaces another employee of the opposite sex and receives less pay);
§ 1620.13(b)(3) (applying EPA when the employer removes one sex from a department
even though the job could be performed by both sexes); § 1620.13(b)(4) (establishing a
violation if one employee succeeds another employee of the opposite sex but receives a
higher wage).
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between men and women performing work which is not exactly
similar." Hence, the EPA is both a sword and a shield.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 is another piece of
legislation used to combat pay disparity. Congress proposed Title VII to
combat racial discrimination in the workplace, 3 but, prior to passing the
act, it added language to ban "sex" discrimination. 4 In fact, members
of Congress added the language in a failed attempt to defeat the
statute. 5 Despite its inauspicious beginning, Title VII's broad scope is
effective in combatting many discriminatory employment practices. 6
Unlike an EPA claim, a Title VII wage-discrimination claim does not
have an equal work requirement." A plaintiff can bring a Title VII
11. See generally Robert H. Cohen, Note, Pay Equity: A Child of the 80s Grows Up,
63 FORDHAM L. REv. 1461, 1467-69 (1995) (discussing the limits of the EPA and
recovery).
12. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 249,
255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994)). Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
13. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 171-72 (1981) (stating that
the draft provision of Title VII extended only to "discrimination based on race, color,
religion, or national origin").
14. Id. at 172. The Court noted that "[]ust two days before voting on Title VII, the
House of Representatives amended the bill to proscribe sex discrimination, but did not
discuss the implications of the overlapping jurisdiction of Title VII, as amended, and the
Equal Pay Act." Id.
15. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 190 n.4 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
16. Id. at 170. The Court stated, "Title Vl1's prohibition of discriminatory
employment practices was intended to be broadly inclusive, proscribing 'not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."'
Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
17. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 168 (1981). The Court accepted
the respondents' theory that "claims for sex-based wage discrimination can be brought
under Title VII even though no member of the opposite sex holds an equal but higher
paying job, provided that the challenged wage rate is not based on seniority, merit,
1996]
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wage discrimination claim by alleging his or her employer pays a
member of the opposite sex differently solely because of that person's
sex."8 Regardless of the theory the plaintiff is pursuing under Title
VII, 9 however, the plaintiff challenging an employment practice always
bears the burden of proving intentional discrimination."
Both the EPA and Title VII have been ineffective in eliminating
wage disparity between men and women because neither statute allows
a plaintiff to state a claim based on a "comparable worth" theory."'
Comparable worth is a method of ranking jobs based on objective factors
and paying comparable salaries to comparably rated jobs.22 Thus, if the
quantity or quality of production, or 'any other factor other than sex."' Id. See, e.g.,
American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 721 (7th Cir. 1986) (permitting a Title
VII cause of action despite the failure to show equal work).
18. Lloyd v. Phillips Bros., Inc., 25 F.3d 518, 524-25 (7th Cir. 1994).
19. Title VII allows plaintiffs to pursue their claims under either the disparate
treatment or disparate impact theories. See infra parts II.A. and II.B. for a complete
discussion on these theories. In a disparate-treatment case, "[t]he ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the
plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113
S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993) (emphasis added) (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
In a disparate-impact case, "the employer carries the burden of producing evidence of
a business justification for his employment practice. The burden of persuasion, however,
remains with the disparate impact plaintiff." Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Antonio,
490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
20. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747-48; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). Lloyd v. Phillips Bros., Inc., 25 F.3d 518, 524-25 (7th Cir. 1994) ("There must
be an intent to discriminate ... an actual desire to pay women less than men because they
are women."). In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court set forth the allocation of
burdens for proving an intentional discrimination claim. The plaintiff must first establish
a prima facie case by showing (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was
qualified and applied for a job; (3) the employer rejected him; and (4) the employer kept
the job open. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. After the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason" for not hiring the plaintiff. Id. If the employer meets this burden, the plaintiff has
the ultimate burden of proving the employer's stated reason was a pretext for discrimina-
tion. Id. at 804. See infra notes 103, 115-16 and accompanying text.
21. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 1469, 1474-75 (proposing that comparable worth
claims would fail under the EPA and Title VII). See, e.g., EEOC v. Madison Comm. Unit
Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 577, 587 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that Title VII does not
recognize comparable worth); American Nurses Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 721 (7th
Cir. 1986) (disapproving a comparable worth cause of action in Title VII claim).
22. American Nurses, 783 F.2d at 719 (comparable worth raises "the ratio of wages
in traditionally women's jobs to wages in traditionally men's jobs"). In Madison Comm.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol50/iss1/14
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skills, working conditions, and intellect required for a job traditionally
held by women are the same as those required for a job traditionally held
by men, then employees in each position should receive the same
salary.' Courts have refused, however, to engage in comparable worth
analyses when deciding wage disparity cases under the EPA or Title
VII.24
The absence of a comparable worth statute contributes to the
Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12, the Seventh Circuit considered a wage disparity claim under Title
VII. 818 F.2d at 586-89. The court defined comparable worth as "paying higher wages
in jobs held mostly by men than in jobs held mostly by women." Id. at 587. The court
viewed this practice of wage disparity discriminatory unless the jobs required different
skills, duties, and working conditions. Id. See infra notes 137-46 and accompanying text.
23. See Fair Pay Hearings, supra note 1, at 71 (testimony of Judith L. Lichtman,
President, Women's Legal Defense Fund) (advocating the Fair Pay Act of 1994 because
it prohibits discriminatory pay disparities between dissimilar jobs that have equivalent
requirements and value to the employer). See also Madison Comm. Unit Sch. Dist. No.
12, 818 F.2d at 587.
24. Courts refuse to entertain comparable worth claims under the Equal Pay Act
primarily because of the explicit "equal pay for equal work" requirement within the statute.
"[A comparable worth] argument is better directed at legislative bodies. This court has
no authority to create a social-utility hierarchy of positions.... The Equal Pay Act only
prohibits employers from paying employees of one sex less than employees of another sex
for 'equal work."' Beavers v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 975 F.2d 792, 801 (1 1th Cir.
1992). See also Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974) ("mhe
[plaintiff] must show that an employer pays different wages to employees of opposite
sexes 'for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions."') (emphasis
added); American Fed'n of State, County, and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO (AFSCME) v.
Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter AFSCME] ("It is evident
from the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act that Congress, after explicit consideration,
rejected proposals that would have prohibited lower wages for comparable work, as
contrasted with equal work.").
Courts similarly refuse to entertain comparable worth claims under Title VII's disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories, noting that Congress did not explicitly provide for
such a scheme. In addressing the disparate impact claim in AFSCME, the Ninth Circuit
stated, "the decision to base compensation on the competitive market, rather than on a
theory of comparable worth, involves the assessment of a number of complex factors not
easily ascertainable, an assessment too multifaceted to be appropriate for disparate impact
analysis." AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1406 (citing Spaulding v. Univ. of Washington, 740 F.2d
686, 708 (9th Cir. 1984)). In regards to the disparate treatment claim, the court stated,
"[t]hough the comparability of wage rates in dissimilar jobs may be relevant to a
determination of discriminatory animus, job evaluation studies and comparable worth
statistics alone are insufficient to establish the requisite inference of discriminatory motive
critical to the disparate treatment theory." Id. at 1407 (citations omitted).
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continued pay disparity between men and women. 25 Under a compara-
ble worth system, plaintiffs could attack the major reason for wage
disparity: sex segregation26 of occupations.2 ' As noted above, Title
VII and the EPA cannot, because of their limitations," attack sex
segregation of occupations. In 1994, a congressional committee debated,
but failed to pass, a comparable worth statute titled the Fair Pay Act of
1994 (FPA).29 Despite its death in committee, the debate on the FPA
25. See Fair Pay Hearings, supra note 1, at 90 (letter from American Federation of
State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO) ("[A]dditional legislation is necessary
to achieve pay equity.").
26. Although hard to distinguish, there appears to be a difference between occupational
segregation and sex segregation. See Fair Pay Hearings, supra note I at 170-71
(testimony of Heidi L. Hartmann, Director of the Institute for Women's Policy Research).
Ms. Hartmann defines "occupational segregation" as paying females "less than comparable
male workers because they work in different occupations." Id. at 170. Ms. Hartmann
testified that some occupations, such as secretaries, bank tellers, nurses, are predominately
held by women, while other occupations, such as engineers and dentists, are held by men.
Id. at 170-71. See Sandra J. Libeson, Comment, Reviving the Comparable Worth Debate
in the United States: A Look Toward the European Community, 16 CoMp. LAB. L.J. 358,
362 (1995) (defining occupational segregation as discrimination in the opportunities
available in the labor market).
Sex segregation, according to Ms. Hartmann, is "attributed to differences in education
and work experience between men and women or to personal choice." However, sex
discrimination also plays a factor in sex segregation. See also Ruth G. Blumrosen, Wage
Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 397, 402-08 (1979) (discussing and identifying historic job segregation
and undervaluation of occupations performed by women).
Sex segregation, according to Blumrosen, occurs when certain occupations are filled
predominantly by one sex. Historically, this has meant women were relegated to jobs such
as elementary school teachers and nurses. These jobs are valued less than jobs which are
predominantly filled by men. Thus, men and women earn different wages because the
market or other forces value the jobs performed by women as less valuable than those
performed by men. Blumrosen, supra, at 402-08.
27. Fair Pay Hearings, supra note 1, at 52, 58 (statement of Michele Leber) (arguing
that wage disparity exists because of occupational segregation); Marion Crain, Confronting
the Structural Character of Working Women's Economic Subordination: Collective Action
vs. Individual Rights Strategies, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 26 (1994) (noting Title VII
cannot protect women from economic disadvantages such as occupational sex segregation);
Robert Nelson, Law, Markets, and Gender Inequality in Pay, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.
61, 68 (1995) (suggesting that women should examine the organizational practices that put
women in an inferior position); Cohen, supra note 11, at 1463 (quoting Marion Crain);
Libeson, supra note 26, at 362 (recognizing that occupational segregation is causing the
wage gap between men and women).
28. See supra note 24.
29. H.R. 4803, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). Representative Eleanor Holmes Norton
of the District of Columbia introduced the Act, noting that 30 years after the passage of
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illustrates the ongoing interest in comparable worth. This section first
examines the operation of the EPA and Title VII and then analyzes the
relative merits of a comparable worth system, proposing that such a
system could decrease wage disparity between the sexes.
II. THE EQUAL PAY ACT AND TITLE VII
A. The Equal Pay Act of 1963
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA)30 provides that an employer
may not pay individuals performing "equal work" differently if the sole
reason for the pay difference is gender.3' Either men or women can use
the EPA to attack wage disparity.32
Several inherent limitations which restrict the EPA's utility in
combatting wage disparity. First, courts have interpreted the term "equal
work" to mean, not literal equivalence, but "substantially equal., 33 This
reading is an attempt to prevent employers from merely using different
job titles 34 to avoid liability under the EPA.35  Thus, the EPA imposes
the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, wage discrimination based on sex, race, or national origin
still existed. Id. at 4.
The FPA was not recommended by the committee for debate on the House floor.
Nevertheless, on April 7, 1995, Rep. Norton brought the FPA to the House floor during
the time allotted for extension of remarks and retitled her bill the "Fair Pay Act of 1995."
141 CONG. REC. E852 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1995).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994).
31. Id.
32. The EPA addresses wage disparity based only on gender, not race or national
origin. Fair Pay Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Rep. Norton). See supra note
8 for text of the EPA. The wage disparity experienced by African-Americans and
Hispanics is just as alarming as gender-based wage disparity. During 1992, African-
American men were paid 72% of what white men received. Id. African-American women
received only 64% of what white men received. Id. During the same year, Hispanic men
earned 65% and Hispanic women earned 55% as much as white men. Id.
33. Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1533 (11th Cir. 1992)
(requiring an EPA plaintiff to "demonstrate only that the skill, effort and responsibility
required in the performance of the jobs are 'substantially equal"'); Fallon v. Illinois, 882
F,2d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1989) ("The work need not be identical; it is sufficient if the
duties are 'substantially equal."'). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1620.14 (1995) (recognizing that
"equal" and "identical" are not the same).
34. Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1461 (7th Cir. 1994) ("In assessing
whether two jobs require equal skill, effort, and responsibility, we look to the duties
actually performed by each employee, and not to his or her job description or title.")
(citations omitted); Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1533 ("Although job titles are entitled to some
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liability on the employer if a man and a woman are performing
essentially similar tasks but one is paid less solely on the basis of
gender.36
A second limitation on the operation of the EPA is the definition of
"establishment" under the statute.37 Courts interpret establishment to
mean the particular locale where the injured plaintiff works.38 Thus, the
plaintiff is restricted to a comparison of his or her wages to those of
other employees of the opposite sex performing equal work at the
plaintiffs place of work.39  The use of this restrictive definition of
establishment can be explained as an attempt to remain consistent with
the definition of establishment under the Fair Labor Standards Act,4" a
weight in this evaluation, 'the controlling factor under the Equal Pay Act is job
content'-the actual duties that the respective employees are called upon to perform.")
(citations omitted); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(comparing the job content of company stewardesses and purser).
35. Laffey, 567 F.d at 447-53. See also 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
37. The EPA provides: "No employer having employees subject to any provisions of
this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are
employed .... " 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (emphasis added). See supra note 8 for the text of
the EPA.
At issue is whether a large employer with offices in several locations must ensure that
men and women performing similar jobs in those different locales are paid the same, or
whether that employer may compare men's and women's wages within one locale.
38. See Mulhall v. Advance Sec., 19 F.3d 586 (11th Cir. 1994) (defining establishment
as "a distinct physical place of business rather than ... an entire business or 'enterprise'
which may include several separate places of business") (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(a)
(1995)). The regulations state that each separate place of business is an establishment.
29 C.F.tR § 1620.9(a). Two portions of an enterprise that are physically located in a
single place may be more than one establishment. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(b). In determining
whether the two portions are more than one establishment, one must consider whether the
two portions engage in separate operations, maintain separate records and employees, and
are physically segregated. Id. If a central administrative unit hires the employees for two
separate portions, sets the wages, and assigns the employees to a particular location, the
two portions may be one establishment. Id. See Brennan v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep.
Sch. Dist., 519 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding the school district is one establishment).
39. Foster v. Arcata Assocs., Inc., 772 F.2d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1985), overruled by
Bishena v. Marriott Corp., 959 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1992). In holding that an employer's
two field offices were not the same establishment, the Ninth Circuit stated, "[w]hen
considering the single establishment issue, federal courts have consistently rejected the
extension of the statutory establishment requirement to separate offices of an employer that
are geographically and operationally distinct." Id.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 201. Because the EPA is an amendment to FLSA, establishment is
defined in reference to the recognized definition of establishment under FLSA. See 29
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recognition that a broad definition would impose a disproportionate
burden on large employers,4 or a recognition that different geographic
locales may have different market forces driving the wage disparity.
The EPA contains four textual exceptions which allow an employer
to justify a wage disparity between men and women performing equal
work.42 If the wage disparity exists because of: (1) a seniority system,
(2) a merit system, (3) a system in which quantity or quality of
production determines wages, or (4) any factor other than sex,43 then
the employer may avoid liability.' These justifications are the sole
C.F.R. § 1620.9.
41. For example, a large employer with multiple offices in different locales could be
required to pay comparable salaries among the employees at the various offices, whereas
a small employer would only have to pay comparable salaries within the single
establishment. The burden occurs when an employee in New York and an employee in
South Dakota are paid the same salaries despite the cost of living.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(i)-(iv). The Supreme Court explained that Congress created
these exceptions to the EPA so as "to incorporate into the new federal Act the well-defined
and well-accepted principles ofjob evaluation so as to ensure that wage differentials based
upon bona fide job evaluation plans would be outside the purview of the Act." Coming
Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 201 (1974).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 206(dXi)-(iv). While three of the listed exceptions to the EPA
(seniority system, merit system, and system based on quantity or quality of production) are
fairly straightforward, the fourth exception-a factor other than sex--has provoked a
considerable amount of litigation. The circuits are split on the proper framework with
which to analyze a "factor-other-than-sex" defense. Jack A. Friedman, Real Gender-
Neutrality for the Factor-Other-than-Sex Defense, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 241
(1994) (arguing that the gender-neutral test is the proper standard for the factor-other-than-
sex defense).
The circuits have applied three different standards to the factor-other-than-sex defense.
Id. The Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits permit the defense if the challenged wage
classification system is gender-neutral and equally applied. Id. See, e.g., Covington v.
Southern Illinois Univ., 816 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1987).
The Second and Eleventh Circuits require an employer to show that the challenged wage
classification system is related to the performance of the employee's job duties if the
employer plans to assert the factor-other-than-sex defense. Id. See, e.g., Tom K. v. Seiler
Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995); Glenn v. General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567,
1571 (llth Cir. 1988).
The Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits require the employer to show a legitimate business
reason for the challenged wage classification system to qualify for the factor-other-than-sex
defense. Id. See, e.g., EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1988);
Maxwell v. City of Tucson, 803 F.2d 444, 447 (9th Cir. 1986); Hodgson v. Robert Hall
Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589, 594 (3d Cir. 1973).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 206(dX I).
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means by which an employer can avoid liability under the EPA.4 5
The burdens of proof required under the EPA are straightforward.46
The plaintiff has the initial burden to establish a prima facie case by
showing that an employer pays a person of the opposite sex within the
employer's establishment a higher wage for substantially equal work.47
After the plaintiff meets the equal work and establishment requirements,
the burden shifts to the employer to justify the wage disparity.48 The
employer must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it was
justified under one of the four recognized exceptions.49 If the employer
fails to justify the wage disparity, the EPA imposes strict liability, and
the plaintiff does not have to prove discriminatory intent.50
Despite the plaintiff-friendly burdens of proof, the EPA fails to deal
effectively with the wage disparity between men and women.5" The
EPA's failure stems from several factors that limit the statute's reach:
First, the equal work standard prevents the EPA from reaching problems
45. See Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974).
46. Id. at 195.
47. Id. See, e.g., Strag v. Board of Trustees, 55 F.3d 943, 948 (4th Cir. 1995)
(outlining EPA prima facie case); Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1018
(11 th Cir. 1994) (quoting Corning Glass prima facie case); Tidwell v. Fort Howard Corp.,
989 F.2d 406, 409 (10th Cir. 1993) (identifying necessary elements of Corning Glass
prima facie case); EEOC v. Romeo Community Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 987 (6th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Corning Glass prima facie case); Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc.,
975 F.2d 1518, 1526 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (explaining that plaintiff's burden is higher in EPA
prima facie case than under Title VII); McKee v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 801 F.2d 1014,
1019 (8th Cir. 1986) (same); Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1136 (5th Cir.
1983) (same).
48. Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 196.
49. Strag, 55 F.3d at 948; Meeks, 15 F.3d at 1018. See supra text accompanying note
42 for a list of the four exceptions. Employers most frequently invoke the factor-other-
than-sex defense. Factors other than sex which courts have recognized as legitimate
"include shift differentials, red circle rates, temporary reassignments, and training
programs." Judge Debra H. Goldstein, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination: Recovery Under
the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, or Both, 56 ALA. LAW. 294, 296 (Sept. 1995) (examining the
EPA and Title VII and their relationship within the Eleventh Circuit).
50. Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1533; Goldstein, supra note 49, at 295-97. If the employer
violates the EPA, the employer must comply with the Act by raising the wages of the
lower paid sex. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.25 (1995). The employer may not remove or transfer
the higher-paid employee, nor may it transfer other employees to perform the lower-paid
jobs. Id.
51. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 1469; Fair Pay Hearings, supra note ], at 90 (Letter
from American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO).
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such as sex segregation in the workplace.52 Thus, female employees
who work in segregated occupations performing similar work as male
employees in other occupations have no recourse under the EPA for
wage disparity.53 Second, the restrictive definition of establishment
prevents employees at a specific locale from addressing wage disparities
for equal work in a large company with offices in several locales.54
Therefore, employees cannot compare themselves with persons of the
opposite sex who perform an equal job in another office, and thus cannot
take advantage of the strict liability afforded by the EPA.55
Third, the recognized exceptions to the prohibition on wage
disparity operate particularly to the disadvantage of women.56 For
example, an employer may justify a wage disparity under the EPA by
showing that the disparity is based on a seniority system. 7 The
seniority system perpetuates male domination, however, by basing
compensation on the historic bias toward men in the United States
employment system.58  Furthermore, a seniority system penalizes
individuals who take time away from their careers to raise children.59
52. See supra note 26 for an explanation of sex segregation.
53. See Fair Pay hearings, supra note 1, at 35 (statement of Mr. Sturdivant, National
President of the American Federation of Government Employees). Women in low-paying,
female-dominated jobs cannot compare their salaries with the higher paying jobs held
predominantly by men. Id. "[W]omen as well as men tend to perceive work associated
with women to be of less value than that done by men." Blumrosen, supra note 26, at
416.
54. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
55. Id.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45 for discussion of the fair justifications
for wage disparity.
57. See supra text accompanying note 43.
58. See generally Blumrosen, supra note 26, at 402-08 (discussing the historical
classification of occupations by sex dating back to the beginning of the industrial
revolution). Blumrosen states that "[e]ven when men and women do roughly the same
kind of work they rarely do so at the same time nor do the jobs have the same titles.
Thus, women are 'cooks' while men are 'chefs'; women are 'hostesses' while men are
'maitre d's'; women are 'secretaries' while men are 'administrative assistants."' Id. at 407.
59. Id. Indeed, Blumrosen postulates that the United States employment system is
structured so as to ensure that women take off time to raise a family. See id. at 420.
Women work in low-paying occupations, thus a woman is more likely than a man to
sacrifice her job to provide care for a couple's family and children because her job
provides "secondary income." Id. at 421. Blumnrosen also argues that society has an
underlying assumption that women should perform work closely linked to a homemaking
role: e.g., as teachers, nurses, and secretaries. Id. at 406.
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Because the great majority of such individuals are women, the seniority
system justification in the EPA serves to perpetuate the wage disparity
between men and women.6w
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 establishes a system whereby an
employee receiving unequal wages for equal work performed by a
member of the opposite sex can challenge the wage disparity. However,
its greatest power is also its greatest limitation, for only where the
particular facts fit the equal work definition can a plaintiff claim the
protection of the EPA's provisions.
B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Congress originally intended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
196461 to prohibit racial discrimination in employment.62  Although
there is little legislative history to indicate how plaintiffs may use Title
VII to attack the wage disparity between men and women, 63  courts
have permitted Title VII wage-disparity claims.6' Under Title VII
claims, plaintiffs may attack wage disparity under either the disparate
60. In American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 719 (7th Cir. 1986), Judge
Posner commented that a major cause of pay differentials is the fact that women
interrupted their careers to raise children. He stated:
[V]irtually the entire difference in the average hourly wage of men and women,
including that due to the fact that men and women tend to be concentrated in
different types of job, [sic] can be explained by the fact that most women take
considerable time out of the labor force in order to take care of their children. As
a result they tend to invest less in their "human capital" (earning capacity); and since
part of any wage is a return on human capital, they tend therefore to be found in jobs
that pay less.
Id.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e2. See supra note 12 for the language of the EPA.
62. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 172 (1981). Congress also
intended the Act to prohibit discrimination based on religion, national origin and color.
Id. Prior to passing the Act, however, the House of Representatives revised the bill to
include sex. Id. See supra note 14.
63. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 172. Because the House of Representatives amended the bill
two days prior to voting on Title VII, neither chamber of Congress was able to analyze
Title VII and its relation to the EPA. Id.
64. See, e.g., Gunther, 452 U.S. at 161; Ryan v. Equity Bank for Savings, No. 95-
6096, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 7551, at *10 (10th Cir. Apr. 11, 1996); Walk v. Rubbermaid
Inc., No. 94-4306, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 5494, at *7 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 1996); Tomka v.
Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1310-13 (2d Cir. 1995); Meeks v. Computer Assoc., Int'l, 15
F.3d 1013, 1016-21 (11th Cir. 1994).
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treatment or disparate impact theories." The plaintiffs prima facie case
depends upon the theory used.
1. DISPARATE TREATMENT
Disparate treatment occurs when an employer treats an employee
differently because of the employee's sex.' A disparate treatment
claim requires the plaintiff to allege that an employment practice treats
one sex differently than the other solely because of gender.67 For
example, in the wage context, a plaintiff may allege that an employer's
practice of paying male truck drivers more than female office workers is
based solely on gender. Title VII has a potentially broader reach than
the EPA because a Title VII wage-disparity claim does not require the
plaintiff to show that the opposite sex is performing equal work as
required by the EPA." However, Title VII has not been effective in
65. See e.g., St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) (recognizing
a Title VII wage disparity claim under disparate treatment rationale); Wards Cove Packing
Co. Inc., v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (recognizing a Title VII wage disparity claim
under disparate impact rationale). See infra notes 63-120 and accompanying text.
66. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977). "Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in
mind when it enacted Title VII." Id. (citing 110 CONG. REc. 13088 (1964) (remarks of
Sen. Humphrey)).
67. Requiring women to contribute more money into a pension than men "does not
pass the simple test of whether the evidence shows 'treatment of a person in a manner
which but for that person's sex would be different.' Los Angeles Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (quoting Developments in the Law,
Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1109, 1174 (1971)).
68. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 168 (accepting respondents' argument that, "claims for sex-
based wage discrimination can be brought under Title VII even though no member of the
opposite sex holds an equal but higher paying job . . . ." (emphasis added)). Gunther
gave early hope that, although a plaintiff could not pursue a comparable worth theory
under the EPA, a comparable worth theory might be pursued under Title VII due to the
absence of the equal-pay-for-equal-work requirement. In Gunther, the petitioner argued
that a wage discrimination claim under Title VII could only be brought if the plaintiff
satisfied the equal work standard set forth in the EPA. Id. at 178. The Court rejected this
argument. Otherwise, an employer could hire a "woman for a unique position" and "then
admit [ ] that her salary would have been higher had she been male," leaving the woman
with no legal redress. Id. at 178-79.
In addressing Title VII claims, the courts apply a "relaxed standard of similarity
between male and female-occupied jobs." Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc.,
975 F.2d 1518, 1526 (1lth Cir. 1992). The employee still has the ultimate burden of
proving intentional sex discrimination. Id.
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eliminating sex-based wage disparities because the plaintiff's burden of
proof is much more difficult to satisfy.69
The Supreme Court established a model for a Title VII disparate-
treatment claim in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.7" This model
is a "three-step procedure of shifting evidentiary obligations." 71 First,
the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case72 by showing the employ-
er's practice results in disparate treatment.' Once the plaintiff makes
a prima facie showing, the burden of production shifts to the defen-
dant.74 The defendant merely has to "articulate some legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason" for engaging in the challenged practice. 5
69. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (requiring Title VII
plaintiffs to prove the employer intended to discriminate). See supra note 20.
70. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
71. MARK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 5.40, at 329
(Practitioner's ed., 1988).
72. McDonnell Douglas was a case of racial discrimination rather than sex
discrimination. The plaintiff's prima facie case for racial discrimination is equally
applicable to sex discrimination cases:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications,
he was rejected; and (iv) that, after the rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The plaintiff must establish the prima facie case
by a preponderance of the evidence. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, there is an
inference the employer engaged in discriminatory conduct. PLAYER, supra note 71, at 329.
However, if the employee fails to establish a prima facie case, the court will grant the
defendant a judgment in its favor. 1d. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Tele-Communications, Inc.,
No. 95-1077, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 2802, at *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 22, 1996); Pruitt v.
Howard County Sheriff's Dep't, No. 95-1193, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 1266, at *4-*6, *12
(4th Cir. Sept. 29, 1995).
73. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 802. The employer's burden is "exceedingly light," because the employer
does not have to convince the jury or the judge of its motive. Peter R. Corbin & John E,
Duvall, Employment Discrimination, 44 MERCER L. REv. 1165, 1167 (1993) (quoting
Perryman v. Johnson Prod. Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1142 (11th Cir. 1983)).
An employer may not, however, offer an explanation for the pay disparity based on
stereotypical notions of the abilities of men and women. Price Waterhouse & Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). For example, an employer could not justify a higher salary
for a male based on the assumption that a male is the primary breadwinner in most
families. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251. The Supreme Court stated, "employ-
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The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the challenged
practice is a result of intentional discrimination by the employer.76 The
plaintiff may use direct or circumstantial evidence to show that the
discrimination is intentional."
The Supreme Court in County of Washington v. Gunther78 further
explained the requirements of a Title VII wage disparity claim while
examining the relationship of Title VII and the EPA.79 Specifically, the
Court examined the Bennett Amendment to Title VIPs° and the affirma-
tive defenses outlined in the EPA.8' The sole issue in Gunther was
whether an employee could pursue a wage disparity claim under Title
VII if the employee could not establish the equal work requirement
necessary for an EPA claim. 82  The Bennett Amendment prohibits a
Title VII wage disparity claim if the employer's conduct is authorized by
one of the four listed exceptions of the EPA.83 The Court held that a
ment decisions cannot be predicated on mere 'stereotyped' impressions about the
characteristics of males and females. Myths and purely habitual assumptions about a
woman's inability to perform certain kinds of work are no longer acceptable reasons for
refusing to employ qualified individuals, or for paying them less." Manhart, 435 U.S. at
707. The Court further stated, "[e]ven a true generalization about the class is an
insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not
apply." Id. at 708.
76. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. "It is important to note, however, that
although the McDonnell Douglas presumption shifts the burden of production to the
defendant, '[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant inten-
tionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff."' St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993) (quoting Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
77. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. The employee may either directly prove that a
discriminatory reason motivated the employer's conduct, or the employee can indirectly
prove that the employer's reason is unworthy of credence. Id.
78. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
79. Id.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) provides:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the
wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such
differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of title 29.
Id.
81. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 167-68. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text for
the four affirmative defenses under the EPA.
82. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 166 n.8.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). See supra notes 42-45 for exceptions to the EPA.
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Title VII wage disparity claim does not require equal work.14  The
Bennett Amendment incorporates only the EPA exceptions into a Title
VII wage disparity claim.85 The Supreme Court's interpretation makes
Title VII potentially more far-reaching than the EPA in challenging sex-
based wage disparities.86
The Supreme Court did not specifically address what the standards
of proof are in a wage-disparity disparate-treatment claim.8 7  As a
result, various circuits apply different standards of proof for wage-
disparity claims. In Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane,88 the Fifth Circuit
analyzed Gunther and concluded that an employee alleging a Title VII
wage-disparity claim must provide direct evidence supporting her claim
that the employer intentionally paid her a lower wage because of her
sex. 89 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in EEOC v. Sears Roebuck &
84. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 168-71. The petitioners argued that the Bennett Amendment
restricted Title VII sex-based wage discrimination claims to only those claims valid under
the Equal Pay Act. Id. at 168. In essence, the petitioners were arguing that claims not
arising from equal work were prohibited. Id. The court rejected this argument, stating,
"ft]he Bennett Amendment was offered as a 'technical amendment' designed to resolve
any potential conflicts between Title VII and the Equal Pay Act." Id. at 170.
85. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 171. Senator Bennett proposed the Amendment in order to
"assure[ ] that the provisions of the Equal Pay Act 'shall not be nullified' in the event of
conflict with Title VII .... [Tihe Amendment as incorporating the [Equal Pay] Act's
affirmative defenses ... than as engrafling all the restrictive features of the Equal Pay Act
onto Title VII." Id. at 174-75. See Goldstein, supra note 49, at 298 ("Title VII was
intended to 'supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to
employment discrimination.... ."') (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S.
36, 46-49 n.9 (1974)).
86. Title VII is potentially more far reaching because it is not hampered by the EPA's
requirements regarding equal work or establishments. Hence, Title VII allows a plaintiff
greater flexibility in drawing comparisons with others.
87. The court stated, "we do not decide in this case how sex-based wage discrimina-
tion litigation under Title VII should be structured.. . ." Gunther, 452 U.S. at 171.
The respondents argued that the County depressed their wages intentionally because they
are women. The respondents offered direct evidence that the County intentionally set their
wage scale at a level below the worth the job warranted. Id. at 166. The County,
however, did not set the male guards wage scale below the worth. Id. Although the Court
concluded that the respondents did not perform work equal to that of the male guards, it
nevertheless found that the evidence proved that the County intentionally discriminated
against the female guards because of their gender, in violation of Title VII. Id. at 181.
88. 713 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1983).
89. Plemer, relying on Gunther, alleged her employer intentionally discriminated
against her because she received less money than what her job was worth. Id. at 1132.
The Plemer court reviewed Gunther and concluded that it requires plaintiffs to offer direct
evidence of intentional discrimination. Id. Plemer failed to meet this standard. The
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Co.,' held that the equal work standard of the EPA applied to Title VII
wage-disparity claims if the employee failed to provide direct evidence
of intentional discrimination.9'
The Eighth Circuit in McKee v. Bi-State Dev. AgencyP2 ruled that
the proper framework for a Title VII wage-disparity claim is the
framework established by the EPA.93  Therefore, a plaintiff must
establish that the employer pays different wages for equal work.94 After
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
defendant to rebut the plaintiff's allegations by using one of the EPA's
four exceptions.95 The defendant is liable under Title VII if it cannot
satisfy this burden.'
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit in Miranda v. B&B Cash Grocery
Store Inc., held that Title VII wage-disparity claims should apply the
traditional framework of shifting burdens established in McDonnell
Douglas.9 The Eleventh Circuit maintains the ultimate burden of
persuasion on the plaintiff, requiring the plaintiff to show that the wage-
disparity resulted from intentional discrimination."
Plemer court concluded that Plemer failed to offer direct evidence that her employer paid
her less because she was female. Id. at 1133.
90. 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
91. Id. The court reviewed the Gunther opinion and determined the Supreme Court
limited its holding to direct evidence. Id. (citing Gunther, 452 U.S. 180-81).
92. 801 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1986). In McKee, the employee argued that the district
court's denial of her Title VII claim was inconsistent with the jury's finding that the
employer violated the EPA. Id. at 1019. The jury determined that McKee proved sex
discrimination under the EPA, which means Bi-State failed to establish an affirmative
defense. Id. Because Bi-State could not prove an affirmative defense, the district court
should not have denied McKee's Title VII claim. Id.
93. Id. at 1019. See also Foster v. Arcata Assoc., Inc., 772 F.2d 1453, 1465 (9th Cir.
1985).
94. Id.
95. McKee, 801 F.2d at 1019.
96. Id.
97. 975 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir. 1992).
98. Id. at 1531. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the McDonnell
Douglas analysis). See also Bishena v. Marriott Corp., 959 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1992)
(following Miranda). The Miranda court rejected the Fifth Circuit's direct evidence
standard because a clever employer could still discriminate against women as long as the
employer did not directly admit to the discriminatory conduct. Id. at 1531.
99. Id. at 1529. In Miranda, the employee proved that the employer's articulated
reasons were a pretext for discrimination. Id.
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Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the
standards of proof in a Title VII wage-disparity claim, in St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks,'"° the Court reaffirmed the McDonnell Douglas
burden-of-proof framework in a race-based claim of disparate treat-
ment.' In Hicks, the employee, following McDonnell Douglas,
established a prima facie Title VII claim, but the employer articulated
two nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. 2 The district court
concluded the employee did not carry the "ultimate burden of proving
that his race was the determining factor. . ,"3 On appeal, the Eighth
Circuit held the employee was entitled to a judgment once he proved the
employer's proffered reasons were pretextual.'" The Supreme Court,
however, rejected the Eighth Circuit's analysis and held that, once the
defendant rebuts the plaintiff's prima facie case, the McDonnell Douglas
framework is irrelevant." 5 The ultimate decision for the trier of fact
is whether the employee proved "'that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against [the employee]' because of his race."'0 6  The
Court emphasized that the plaintiff must allege and prove intentional
discrimination; thus, by implication, it affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's
approach to wage disparity claims. 7
2. DISPARATE IMPACT
A claim based on a disparate-impact theory requires the plaintiff to
allege and prove that a facially neutral employment practice has a
disparate impact on a protected Title VII class.'0 8 The Supreme Court
100. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
101. Id. at 274647.
102. Id. at 2747.
103. Id. at 2748.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2749.
106. Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
(1981)).
107. See Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Inc., 975 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir. 1992).
108. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335
n.15(1977) (defining disparate impact as a facially neutral employment practice that effects
one group more harshly than another group). A protected class under Title VII is a group
classified according to race, sex, national origin, color, or religion. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (1988). Once a plaintiffean establish that he was discriminated against because
of his membership in such a group he has satisfied the protected class requirement. Id.
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recognized the disparate-impact theory in Griggs v. Duke Power Co."0
In Griggs, the employer required new applicants to have a high school
diploma or pass a general intelligence exam."0 African-American
employees filed suit alleging the requirement negatively affected a
protected class."' The Supreme Court held that such requirements
violate Title VII, unless the requirements are demonstrably related to the
performance of the job."2 Because the challenged practice in Griggs
was facially neutral, the Court did not require the plaintiff to show an
intent to discriminate."' Instead, the plaintiff's prima facie case must
identify a particular employment practice that, although seemingly
innocuous, has a disproportionate impact on a protected class."4
109. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
110. Id. at 425-26.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 436.
113. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645-46 (1989) ("Under this
basis for liability, which is known as the 'disparate-impact' theory and which is involved
in this case, a facially neutral employment practice may be deemed violative of Title VII
without evidence of the employer's subjective intent to discriminate that is required in a
'disparate-treatment' case."). Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 ("[G]ood intent or absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures... that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups .... ").
Wards Cove operates canneries during the summer months. The company had two job
types: cannery jobs (unskilled positions) and non-cannery jobs (skilled positions). The
non-cannery jobs, which were filled by whites, paid more than the cannery jobs, which
were filled by nonwhites. Id. at 647. The nonwhite cannery workers filed a Title VII
claim, alleging Wards Cove hiring practices caused the racial segregation, thus denying the
nonwhites a non-cannery job because of race. Id. at 647-48.
114. The Court stated, "[a]s a general matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the
application of a specific or particular employment practice that has created the disparate
impact under attack." Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657. The nonwhite employees alleged
that Wards Cove engaged in "several 'objective' employment practices (e.g., nepotism,
separate hiring channels, rehire preferences), as well as the use of 'subjective decision
making"' that had a disparate impact on them. Id.
The Ninth Circuit considered whether a disparate impact theory was applicable in a suit
where an employer decided to rely on market-determined wages rather than implement
wage equalization based on a comparable worth study. AFSCME, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405-06
(9th Cir. 1985). AFSCME argued that using the market rates to determine wages had an
adverse impact on women because women, as a class, have historically received lower
wages. Id. The Ninth Circuit rejected AFSCME's argument and stated:
Disparate impact analysis is confined to cases that challenge a specific, clearly
delineated employment practice applied at a single point in the job selection process.
... The instant case does not involve an employment practice that yields to disparate
impact analysis.... [T]he decision to base compensation on the competitive market,
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Although a plaintiff in a disparate-treatment suit can establish a
prima facie case with circumstantial evidence, a disparate-impact plaintiff
must use direct evidence to establish a prima facie case."' A dispa-
rate-impact plaintiff may rely on statistics to prove his or her allega-
tions." 6 In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,"' the Supreme Court
raised the evidentiary standard for a disparate-impact plaintiff. In
addition to comparing the "racial composition of the qualified persons in
the labor market" with those hired,"' the plaintiff must show that the
employer's conduct created the disparate impact."9
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then
shifts' to the defendant to justify the challenged practice by showing
that it legitimately serves the employer's interests.' Even if the
defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff may still prevail by showing
the availability of an alternate practice that would meet the employer's
interests without resulting in a disproportionate impact on the protected
rather than on a theory of comparable worth, involves the assessment of a number
of complex factors not easily ascertainable, an assessment too multifaceted to be
appropriate for disparate impact analysis.
AFSCME, 770 F.2d at 1404-05 (citations omitted).
115. See Robert Turner, Thirty Years of Title Vi's Regulatory Regime: Rights,
Theories, and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REv. 375, 448 (1995).
116. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); International Brotherhood of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). The use of statistics, however, turns a simple
disparate impact claim into a "highly technical issue on which expert testimony... " is
usually required. Turner, supra note 115, at 453 (quoting George Rutherglen, Abolition
in a Different Voice, 78 VA. L. REv. 1463, 1476 (1992)).
117. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
118. Id. at 650. The Court of Appeals erred when it compared the racial composition
of one job with that of another job. Id. at 651. Otherwise, the Court said an employer
would have to adopt a quota to ensure the racial composition was equal among its work
force. Id. at 652.
119. Id. at 657. An employee could not look "at the bottom line" to prove a racial
imbalance among the employer's work force. Id.
120. Like a "disparate treatment" case, the Supreme Court defined the defendant's
burden as a burden of production. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659. Defendants need to
produce some legitimate business justification for the challenged practice in order to meet
their burden. The burden of persuasion, however, remains with the plaintiff. Id.
121. Id.
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class in question.' If the employer could have implemented such a
practice and did not, the plaintiff may prevail on the disparate-impact
claim. 23
C. The Ineffectiveness of Title VII
There are two reasons why Title VII has not been effective in
ending wage disparities between men and women. First, claims under
Title VII are difficult to prove.'24 The burden of persuasion in a
disparate treatment claim rests at all times on the plaintiff.2 5 This is
a heightened and difficult burden because the plaintiff must prove
intentional discrimination.'26  Similarly, employers easily justify
practices challenged under disparate-impact claims. A disparate-impact
claim is not very difficult for an employer to justify because the
challenged practice is facially neutral.'27
122. Id. at 660-61. The employee's alternative suggestions must be as effective to
meet the employers' objectives as the challenged procedure. Id.
123. Id. It is important to note that Congress codified the approach for disparate
impact claims under Title VII in the employment context in the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
Goldstein, supra note 49, at 298. However, the 1991 Civil Rights Act provides that the
employer's burden in such a case is one of production and persuasion. Id. The Act
provides:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this
subchapter only if-
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employ-
ment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (1994).
124. See Fair Pay Hearings, supra note 1, at 13 (statement of Robert M. Tobias,
National President of the National Treasury Employees Union). Mr. Tobias noted the
courts have placed an "overwhelming burden" on Title VII plaintiffs because it is difficult
to present evidence that an employer intentionally designed a pay system to disadvantage
a protected class. Id.
125. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747 (1993) (quoting Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
126. Id.
127. See New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979) (suggesting a
"job related" justification). Despite Beazer, lower courts still use the "business necessity"
standard. PLAYER, supra note 71, at 368. In order to satisfy the business necessity, the
employer must show a compelling business purpose for the practice, the practice must
cany on this purpose effectively, and there must not be an available alternative practice
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Second, Title VII has been ineffective in ending wage disparity
because comparable worth is not a valid claim.'28 Courts have stead-
fastly refused to permit comparable worth claims to prevail under Title
VII. 29 Even if a court were to recognize the comparable worth theory,
a Title VII plaintiff would still have to prove that a member of the
opposite sex holds a comparatively equal job,3' and that the employ-
er's failure to pay equally for these comparatively equal jobs was
intentional.'
III. THE DEBATE OVER COMPARABLE WORTH
Comparable worth is not a new concept.'32 For as long as
Congress has considered equal pay legislation, it has debated comparable
worth.' During World War II, the National War Relations Board
(NWRB) passed regulations requiring employers to provide equal pay for
jobs of comparable worth. 3 If pay inequities existed between jobs of
comparable worth, the employer was required to correct the disparity by
paying equal wages."' Yet, after the end of World War II, congressio-
that would accomplish the business purpose. Williams v. Colorado Springs Sch. Dist. No.
11, 641 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1981).
128. Lloyd v. Phillips Bros., 25 F.3d 518, 525 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing EEOC v.
Madison Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 F.2d 577, 587 (7th Cir. 1987)). See also
Cohen, supra note 11, at 1475-76.
129. See, e.g., Lloyd, 25 F.3d at 525 ("[C]omparable worth is not a theory of liability
under Title VII.").
130. Plaintiffs' burden to demonstrate that their jobs are "comparatively equal" to
another, higher paid job, does not mean that the tasks performed in each are "substantially
equal" to those of a coworker of the opposite sex. Rather, the jobs are judged to be
comparatively equal based on an evaluation of the jobs' attributes, regardless of task
similarity. See infra notes 13746 and accompanying text.
131. Cohen, supra note 11, at 1475.
132. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 185 n.1 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
133. Id.
134. ld. at 185 n.1. The regulations required employers to conduct evaluations ofjobs
within a plant. Id.
135. Id. However, the NWRB did not attempt to challenge the wage disparity that
existed in jobs which had traditionally been performed by women. Instead, the NWRB
only addressed wage disparity where women were performing jobs traditionally performed
by men. See generally Blumrosen, supra note 26, at 423-24 (discussing the NWRB's
actions concerning comparable worth during World War II).
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nal debates over equal pay" 6 failed to result in any legislation until the
Equal Pay Act of 1963. '3 The legislative history and the terms of the
EPA reveal that Congress specifically rejected comparable worth in favor
of an equal-pay-for-equal-work standard.
38
A comparable worth system analyzes jobs by assessing a set of
objective factors, and then ranking the jobs on a point system according
to their score on each of the objective factors. 39  For example, a
typical comparable worth analysis assigns point values for a particular
job within a particular firm by analyzing the job's (1) knowledge and
skill requirements,"' ° (2) mental demands,' 4 ' (3) accountability,'42
and (4) working conditions. 43  Each job earns points based on its
particular attributes.'" The job is then ranked against other jobs in
136. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 185 n.l.
137. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). See supra note 8 for the text of EPA.
138. See generally Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 198, 195-202
(1974) (discussing the legislative history and debates before passage of the Equal Pay Act).
139. MARK ALDRICH & ROBERT BUCHELE, THE ECONOMICS OF COMPARABLE WORTH
51 (1986). Typically, experts rate every job against certain factors and they rank "each
job on a scale for each of the factors" and they add these points for a total score. Id. at
51-53.
140. The knowledge and skill requirement calls for an assessment of any special "job
knowledge" the employee has acquired through education or training. See ALDRICH &
BUCHELE, supra note 139, at 53. It also may include interpersonal skills necessary to
perform a particular job. Id. The more knowledge and skill required, the higher the score.
See id.
141. The mental demands factor requires an assessment of the cognitive requirements
to perform a particular job. See id This includes the amount of independent judgment
the employee has to exercise and the extent the employee can engage in decisionmaking
and problem solving. Id. Thus, a job requiring constant problem solving would score
higher than a job requiring standardized routine activities. Id.
142. The accountability factor assesses the degree to which the particular job has
oversight or responsibility for overseeing other persons. See id.
143. Working conditions include any factors that could distinguish one occupation
from another. Such factors include exposure to hazards, whether work is performed
standing or sitting, and the exertion required to perform the job. See id.
144. ALDRICH & BUCHELE, supra note 139, at 51-53. The Aldrich and Buchele model
gives a point range for each listed factor in a comparable worth analysis. For instance, the
possible score for knowledge and skills ranges from 60 to 280 points. For mental
demands, the range is 8 to 140 points. For accountability, the range is 11 to 160 points,
and for working conditions, the range is 0 to 20 points. Id. at 51-53. Each job is scored
within these ranges and compared to other jobs to determine which jobs deserve
comparatively equal pay. Id. For example, a nurse may receive the following scores: 280
for knowledge; 122 for mental demands; 160 for accountability and a 9 for working
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order of highest to lowest score.'45 Jobs earning higher point scores
warrant higher salaries, while jobs earning lower point scores warrant
lower salaries, and jobs earning similar scores warrant similar sala-
ries,"'46 even if job titles or descriptions are vastly different.'47
Women continue to earn less than men because women tend to be
segregated into lower paying jobs.'48 Under the current employment
system, an employer pays wages based on a combination of market
forces and individual skill and knowledge.'49 Unfortunately, men and
women tend to occupy segregated positions within the labor force, with
jobs dominated by men earning higher wages than jobs dominated by
women.'s5  Women tend to fill the occupations the market determines
conditions, which totals 571. A laundry clerk, however, may receive a 70 for knowledge;
10 for mental demands; 11 for accountability and 17 for working conditions, which totals
108. Id. at 53.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. If an office clerk's score is equal to a truck driver's, although the jobs are
vastly different, the particular attributes of the jobs dictate equal pay for the two positions.
See ALDRICH & BUCHELE, supra note 139, at 51-53.
148. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text for an explanation of sex
segregation among occupations.
149. Under neoclassical economic theory, wage rates are the result of individualized
determinations ofeach worker's skills and abilities, and reflect community prejudices about
the relative values of these skills. See Blumrosen, supra note 26, at 447. According to
this economic theory, wage discrimination in a free market economy is impossible because
wage rates reflect the laws of supply and demand. Id. at 446. Thus, a discriminating
employer would have to overpay some employees, raising the discriminating employers'
labor costs above those of the nondiscriminating employer, making the discriminating
employer less competitive. Thomas H. McCarthy, Jr., Note, "Market Value" as a Factor
"Other Than Sex" in Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Claims, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 1027,
1052-53.
150. Women tend to be segregated into the lower-paying jobs in the market. The
market does not view "women's work" to be as valuable as jobs traditionally performed
by men. Id. at 416-20. Accord Jennifer M. Quinn, Visibility and Value: The Role of Job
Evaluation in Assuring Equal Pay for Women, 25 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1403, 1411
(1994) ("In contrast to the institutionalized recognition of the demands of predominantly
male jobs, many skills associated with the types ofjobs held by women, such as nursing,
teaching, and the like, seem to go unrecognized precisely because they mirror traditional
duties within the home.").
The Supreme Court stated in Manhart that employment decisions based upon
"stereotyped" impressions about the characteristics of males and females were improper.
City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978).
Nevertheless, even though an employer cannot base an employment decision on a sexual
stereotype, these stereotypes still operate in the marketplace to drive women into
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are the least valuable, thus causing them to earn less than men.'
The EPA and Title VII are not effective in addressing the problem
of sex segregation among occupations. Under the EPA, claims arise only
when the plaintiff can identify a person of the opposite sex who is
performing essentially the same job for a higher wage.'52 Thus, a
female office worker can only compare her salary with a male office
worker, and not with, for example, a male electrician.'53 Under Title
VII, an employer can assert a defense that the disparity in the wages of
a female office worker and a male electrician is market-driven. 154  If
such a defense is asserted, plaintiffs are helpless under Title VII because
courts have held that reliance upon the market to determine wages is
occupations linked to a homemaking role, such as teaching children, nursing the sick or
preparing food. Unfortunately, society in general and employers specifically continue to
think of certain occupations as "women's work." Blumrosen, supra note 26, at 406, 408.
151. Gender enters into wage rate calculation because "women's work" is simply
judged less valuable by the community. Blumrosen, supra note 26, at 447. The market
undervalues women's work because of the historically lower social status of women in
society. Quinn, supra note 150, at 1407. Thus, women's wages are depressed because
they are segregated into jobs which society views as inherently less valuable, either
because they are associated with women's traditional duties in the home or because they
reflect the historically lower status of women in society. Id.
Blumrosen proposes that "the establishment of present or past job segregation...
should create an inference of wage discrimination sufficient to constitute a prima facie
case" under Title VII. Blumrosen, supra note 26, at 459. Contra Bruce A. Nelson et al.,
Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MiCH.
J.L. REF. 233 (1980) (arguing that comparable worth claims should not be allowed under
Title VII because the market is an adequate judge of a person's worth).
Comparable worth remains a controversial remedy for wage disparities between men and
women. Economists criticize comparable worth as an undue influence on the free market.
A recent article noted:
Many economists believe that lower wages in female-dominated jobs are not cause
for concern because they are based on actual differences between female and male
workers; they argue that women may be simply less productive than men or may
prefer traditionally female-dominated jobs, thereby crowding them and driving down
wages. Economists generally believe that market forces work well to eradicate those
wage differences between people or occupations that are not related to productivity.
Heidi I. Hartmann & Stephanie Aaronson, Pay Equity and Women's Wage Increases:
Success in the States, A Model for the Nation, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'y 69, 73-74
(1994). See also American Nurses, 783 F.2d at 719-20.
152. See supra note 47 for plaintiff's prima facie case under the EPA.
153. See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of equal work.
154. But see McCarthy, supra note 149 (arguing that courts should reject use of
market value as a factor-other-than-sex defense under Title VII and the EPA).
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insufficient evidence of intentional discrimination.'
A comparable worth statute, however, could address the sex
segregation among occupations and would be effective in equalizing
women's and men's wages.'56 By definition, a comparable worth
system ignores present market forces57 and compares jobs based on
objective factors, such as working conditions and the skill and knowledge
required to perform a particular job.' Therefore, women in lower
paying jobs could force their wages up into an equilibrium with other
jobs traditionally dominated by men.5 9 A comparable worth system
would have a two-pronged effect on women's wages. First, women's
155. See, e.g., International Union v. Michigan, 886 F.2d 766, 769 (6th Cir. 1989)
("Mere failure to rectify traditional wage disparities that exist in the marketplace between
predominantly male and predominantly female jobs is not actionable.") (citing Spaulding
v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 706-07 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036
(1984)). As one court explained:
The inference of discriminatory motive which AFSCME seeks to draw from the
State's participation in the market system fails, as the State did not create the market
disparity and has not been shown to have been motivated by impermissible sex-based
considerations in setting salaries....
We fin d nothing in the language of Title VII or its legislative history to indicate
Congress intended to abrogate fundamental economic principles such as the laws of
supply and demand or to prevent employers from competing in the labor market.
AFSCME, 770 F.2d 1401, 1406-07 (9th Cir. 1985).
156. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 1480 (suggesting comparable worth as a solution
to wage disparity).
157. One of the important features of a comparable worth system is a rejection of the
reliance on market forces currently used to establish wage rates for individual occupations.
See Blumrosen, supra note 26, at 428, 441-42 (discussing community wage rate). Under
the current system, wages are determined by assessing the skills and abilities of the
individual who will fill the job, thus, gender discrimination can enter into the calculation
of the market wage. Id. at 442. By contrast, under a comparable worth system. each job
is itself evaluated by measuring the attributes of the job. Id. at 429-34. This process
eliminates the possibility that gender considerations enter into the calculation of the proper
wage rate. Id.
158. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text for the factors to consider under
a comparable worth system.
159. But see American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986). Justice
Posner argues that comparable worth will upset market equilibrium, undermining the goals
of a comparable worth system. Id. at 719. Specifically, he notes that if wages increase
for those jobs that are traditionally held by women, women may not pursue those jobs
traditionally held by males. Id. In addition, men will start to pursue traditionally women's
jobs. Id. at 719-20. Eventually, there will not be enough jobs for women seeking
traditionally women's jobs. Id.
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wages would rise to the higher-paying level of jobs dominated by men,
thereby helping to eliminate the wage disparity between men and
women.I" Second, the wages of traditionally female-dominated jobs
would rise and subsequently attract males into those positions.'
IV. THE FAIR PAY ACT OF 1994
As others have tried since the end of World War 11,162 Representa-
tive Eleanor Holmes Norton proposed the Fair Pay Act of 1994
(FPA).16' Like the EPA, the FPA would have amended the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, instituting a comparable worth system based on
skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions."6 The FPA
defined "equivalent jobs" to mean dissimilar jobs that are equivalent
based on the requirements-skill, duties, effort and working condi-
tions. 6  Unfortunately, like every other proposal for a comparable
worth system, Congress failed to pass the FPA.'"
V. How SHOULD A COMPARABLE WORTH SYSTEM
BE IMPLEMENTED?
Thus far, courts have consistently refused to recognize comparable
worth systems, citing existing federal legislation addressing pay
160. This assumes, of course, that a comparable worth scheme would contain a rule
like that in the EPA which provides that instead of lowering the higher salary, the lower
salary must be raised. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.25 (1995). This remedy may be short-lived,
however, because, historically, when women enter an occupation traditionally dominated
by men, the wage rate for that occupation drops. Marion Crain, Between Feminism and
Unionism: Working Class Women, Sex Equality, and Labor Speech, 82 GEO. L.J. 1903,
1922-23 (1994).
161. Logically, by increasing the wages oftraditionally female dominated occupations,
presumably, men would be more willing to fill those jobs. American Nurses, 783 F.2d at
719-20. Economists argue, however, that such a change would disrupt the labor market
by causing a rush to fill higher paying jobs, leaving other occupations unoccupied, and
more workers unemployed because of the overcrowding in the higher paying occupations.
Hartmann & Aaronson, supra note 151, at 73-74.
162. See generally Goldstein, supra note 49 (discussing congressional efforts to pass
equal pay legislation since the end of World War II).
163. H.R. 4803, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
164. 141 CoNO. REC. E852, 853 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1995) (remarks of Hon. Eleanor
Holmes Norton).
165. H.R. 4803, § 3.
166. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
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disparities. 167  In essence, courts have passed the responsibility to
Congress to explicitly create a comparable worth system. Because no
movement to recognize comparable worth will come from the federal
courts, other alternatives should be explored. This Section will examine
three options. First, Congress could implement comparable worth by
enacting legislation explicitly creating a comparable worth system.
Second, individual states could enact comparable worth statutes. Finally,
individual employees could use existing mechanisms provided in the
National Labor Relations Act'68 to bargain with their employers to
create a comparable worth scheme. 69
A. Federal Legislation
The United States had a limited comparable worth system during
World War II under the NWRB.' 70  In fact, from the end of World
War II until the passage of the EPA, the United States did not have any
form of equal wage legislation.' 7' However, prior to passing the EPA,
Congress dismissed the comparable worth idea in favor of equal pay for
equal work. 72  The recent failure to pass the Fair Pay Act of 1994173
167. See supra parts II.A., II.B.
168. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994).
169. Cohen, supra note 11, at 1480-88 (asserting that the NLRA is a better vehicle
than the EPA for instituting comparable worth); Crain, supra note 27 (arguing that
collective action is superior to other methods for combating women's economic
subordination).
170. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 185 n. 1 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that comparable work was not a new concept in the EPA because
during World War II the NWRB enacted regulations to ensure equal pay for comparable
work).
171. See § 2, 77 Stat. at 56.
172. One member of Congress explained the purpose of the Equal Pay Act:
What we seek is to insure, where men and women are doing the same job under the
same working conditions that they will receive the same pay....
[T]he jobs in dispute must be the same in work content, effort, skill, and
responsibility requirements, and in working conditions.. . . [The EPA] is not intended
to compare unrelated jobs, or jobs that have been historically and normally
considered by the industry to be different.
109 CONG. REc. 9196 (1963) (statement of Rep. Frelinghuysen).
173. H.R. 4803, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). Section 3 of the Fair Pay Act would
have stated:
No employer ... shall discriminate between its employees on the basis of sex, race,
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is evidence of Congress' continuing reluctance to embrace comparable
worth. Thus, it is very unlikely that Congress will implement
comparable worth legislation in the near future. 74
B. State-Sponsored Legislation
Individual states could pass legislation providing a comparable
worth system. Since 1981, several states have enacted equal pay statutes
prohibiting wage disparity based on sex or for paying one sex in an
occupation lower than the other sex who is employed in an occupation
of comparable work or character.'75 A few states have enacted compa-
or national origin by paying wages to employees or groups of employees at a rate
less than the rate at which the employer pays wages to employees or groups of
employees of the opposite sex or different race or national origin for work in
equivalent jobs.
H.R. 4803.
174. It is important to note that the comparable worth debate is not a unique concept.
For a discussion of the comparable worth scheme in Ontario, Canada and Great Britain see
Quinn, supra note 150.
175. See Pay Equity and Comparable Worth, 55 (BNA) (1984). See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 18.80.220(5) (1995) (comparable character or work); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-610
(Michie 1995) (comparable work); IDAHO CODE § 44-1702 (1977) (comparable work); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 337.423 (MichielBobbs-Menill 1990) (comparable work); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 628 (West 1964) (comparable work); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
149, § 105A (West 1996) (comparable character or comparable operations); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 471.992 (West 1994) (comparable work); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1219 (1993)
(comparable work); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06.1-03 (1987) (comparable work); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 198.1 (West 1986) (comparable work); OR. REV. STAT. § 652.220
(1995) (comparable character); S.D. CODIFIED LAW ANN. § 60-12-15 (1993) (comparable
work); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-2-202 (1991) (comparable work); W. VA. CODE § 21-5B-3
(1996) (comparable character).
These statutes do not incorporate comparable worth. Alaska requires an employer to
pay men and women the same wage if they perform "work of comparable character of
work in the same operation, business, or type of work in the same locality." ALASKA
STAT. § 18.80.220(5). Oregon requires an employer to pay similar wages "for work of
comparable character, the performance of which requires comparable skills." OR. REV.
STAT. § 652.220(1)(a). Maine, which prohibits wage discrimination for comparable work,
compares the skills and responsibilities of each employee. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 26,
§ 628.
The language provided in these state statutes is similar to that of the Equal Pay Act,
which prohibits an employer from paying one sex a different wage "for equal work on jobs
the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility.... ." 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)(1).
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rable worth statutes for public employees. 76
Although individual states could enact comparable worth statutes,
there are several disadvantages to a state-by-state approach. First, for the
individual female employee, her ability to receive comparatively equal
pay will vary from state to state. Second, without provisions similar to
those contained in the EPA that prevent male salaries from being lowered
to meet female salaries, bringing wage disparity into equilibrium is
politically -unpopular.' In addition, under such a provision, employers
would likely be economically hard pressed to pay the necessary increases
to women to bring their wages equal with those of men. Also, if
neoclassical economic theory on comparable worth is correct,' states
must be concerned with disrupting their labor markets by driving up
wages, causing businesses to relocate to states without comparable worth
statutes.
C. Individual Employee Action Through Collective Bargaining
Employees could use existing national labor statutes, specifically the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),'79 to implement comparable
worth. '8 Rather than relying on federal or state legislation, employees
could bargain for comparable worth systems through their labor
unions. '  The NLRA requires employers to negotiate with unions
concerning wages and hours, as well as other terms and conditions of
176. "[Twenty-four] states (including the District of Columbia) have undertaken studies
to assess whether women in state government are paid less for their work than men in
comparable positions." Fair Pay Hearings, supra note 1, at 54. Of these 24 states, 20
have "adjusted the wages of women workers to remove pay biases." Id. See MONT. CODE
ANN. § 2-18-208 (1993) (establishing a comparable worth standard for state government
employees). See generally Pay Equity and Comparable Worth, supra note 175, at 55-61
(discussing state legislation). Originally, several states concentrated on pay equity in the
public sector. Some states passed laws requiring a review or restructuring of existing pay
systems. Other states, however, issued legislative orders that have indirectly affected the
existing pay system. Id. at 55.
177. See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
178. Id.
179. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994)
180. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 1480-93 (suggesting the use of the National Labor
Relations Act to implement comparable worth).
181. Cohen suggests that employees and their employers, as opposed to federal judges,
could develop their own payment schedule in such a way to ensure comparable worth. Id.
at 1480.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol50/iss1/14
GENDER INEQUALITY AND WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
employment.'82 Under this approach, employees could require their
labor unions to negotiate a comparable worth system into the labor
contract. In this way, a comparable worth system would be implemented
on a firm-by-firm basis through each labor union's power to negotiate the
employees' rights with the employers.8 3
The advantages of establishing comparable worth through collective
bargaining include avoiding restrictive judicial interpretations of
legislation."' Individual negotiation prevents courts from undercutting
a comparable worth system on the basis of contract theory."8 5 Individ-
ual negotiation also ensures that comparable worth is the benefit that the
employees want."8 For example, under national legislation establish-
ing comparable worth, employees may be required to forego other
desirable benefits in order to comply with the comparable worth
system.8 7 However, under collective bargaining, employees can decide
a comparable worth scheme is more important than other possible
benefits the employer could provide.'88
The major disadvantage to the employee action approach is that,
historically, women have made up a small number of labor unions'
membership.8 9 Thus, even though collective bargaining may be an
effective tool for implementing comparable worth, unless women can
exert power within the labor unions to which they belong, this approach
could be largely ineffective in eliminating gender differences in wages.
182. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). Under § 158(a)(5) an employer cannot "refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section
159(a) of this title." Section 159(a) states that the representatives selected to represent the
employees may bargain with "respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment.. . ." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
183. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
184. Cohen, supra note 11, at 1481. Because the federal courts are reluctant to view
comparable worth as a Title VII cause of action, women and minorities should seek
protection from their unions. Id.
185. See id.
186. Id. at 1482.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Cohen, supra note 11, at 1483; Crain, supra note 27, at 30; Crain, supra note
160, at 1942-46.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The United States has had a long history of sex discrimination
which continues to this day."re The controversy surrounding wage
differences between men and women has existed at least since World
War II."9' It is clear that the EPA and Title VII have not proved
effective in equalizing men's and women's wages. Women still earn less
than men throughout their employed life."9 Many scholars agree that
comparable worth is the only way to combat the wage disparity problem
because it squarely addresses the problem of sex segregation between
occupations. Sex segregation, caused by sexual stereotypes and the
historically-based lower social status of women, is the biggest cause of
the continued pay disparity between men and women.'93 However,
Congress and the federal courts have been very reluctant to embrace
comparable worth because of concerns with its effect on the natural
progression of the economy.' 94 However, it is clear that women earn
less than men under the present economic structure 95 and continuing
the status quo will do little to eliminate wage differentials between men
and women.
B. Tobias Isbelr
190. Over 120 years ago, a Supreme Court justice wrote:
Man is, or should be, women's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of
the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family organization, which if
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which belong,
or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman
adopting a distinct independent career from that of her husband....
The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the noble and
benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872).
191. See County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 185 n.1 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). See also Goldstein, supra note 49.
192. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 26-27, 52-53 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 170-73.
195. See supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
* J.D. 1996, Washington University.
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